Skill Mismatch and Labor Productivity: Evidence from Two Emerging Sectors of Bangladesh

Kazi Iqbal Maruf Ahmed

BIDS Research Almanac 2023 18 May 2023

Conceptual Issues: Skill Mismatch

Skill Mismatch

Skill mismatch refers to various types of imbalances between skills offered (supplied) and skills needed (demanded) in the labor market.

- Various types of skill mismatch
- → Skill Gap
- → Skill Shortage
- → Vertical Mismatch (over-education, under-education)
- →Horizontal Mismatch (field of study)
- Skill mismatch, in all of its forms, is a major source of labor underutilization.
- In this study we focus only on vertical and horizontal mismatch

Vertical mismatch (Over-education and Under-education)

• Measured at the level of individual's circumstances, over-education and under-education refer to the degree to which workers' education levels are above, below or poorly matched to those required for their current jobs.

Measurement:

• Comparison of desired and actual level of education level for an occupation

Horizontal Mismatch (mismatch of field of study)

• Horizontal Mismatch refers to situations where workers get employed in jobs that are neither related to their education, nor their skills and knowledge. The measure identifies any mismatch between the workers' primary field of study and the skill required for their current jobs.

Measurement:

• Comparison of desired and actual level of field of education for an occupation

Objective of the study

• Educational mismatch

i. What is the extent of vertical (level of education) and horizontal mismatch (field of education)?

ii. What is the effect of these two mismatch on firm-level laborproductivity?

iii. What is the effect of these two mismatch on wage rates of the workers?

Literature review

- Vertical mismatch (over education): Disequilibrium or equilibrium? Irrational or rational response?
- Overeducated people earn more than people who work in equivalent jobs but have attained the level of schooling required for that job (Sicherman, 1991; Sloane, 2003).[developed countries]
- Positive (negative) impact of over- (under-)education on firm productivity

The effect of over-education on productivity is stronger among firms: (i) with a higher share of high-skilled jobs, (ii) belonging to high-tech/knowledge-intensive industries. (Mahy et al. 2015) [Belgium, panel, 1999-2010]

- Job-worker mismatch induces a cognitive decline with respect to immediate and delayed recall abilities, cognitive flexibility and verbal fluency (de Grip et al, 2008) [Netherlands]
- Hardly any evidence for developing countries!

Data

- Labor market study of SEIP (Skills for Employment Investment Program)
- Two sectors:

- Light engineering: Capital machinery (full machine), construction equipment, spare parts for automobiles/agro-processing, body for bus, car, van, others

- Electronics: Light, fan, television, home appliances, battery, generator, transformer

Light engineering: 123 Electronics: 100

Unit of analysis: Firm-occupation level: 2221

Occupation groups: Managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals, service and sales workers, craft workers and plant workers

Incidence of mismatch

• Table: Desired and actual level of education (in Years)

| Occupations | No. of | Desired level of | Actual level of |
|---------------------------|----------|-------------------------|------------------|
| | reported | education by | education by the |
| | workers | the firms | firms |
| Managers | 948 | 11.004 | 9.788 |
| Professionals | 22 | 14.318 | 12.409 |
| Technicians and associate | 162 | 10.710 | 8.370 |
| professionals | | | |
| Service and sales workers | 97 | 9.649 | 7.639 |
| Craft workers and plant | 992 | 9.252 | 6.184 |
| operators | | | |
| Total | 2221 | 10.174 | 8.007 |
| | | | |

Table: Incidence of vertical mismatch

| Occupations | No. of reported workers | No. (share) of workers with vertical mismatch | No. (share) of workers with over- education | No. (share) of workers with under- education |
|---|-------------------------------|--|--|---|
| Managers | 948 | 625 (65.93) | 190 (20.04) | 435 (45.89) |
| Professionals | 22 | 10 (45.45) | 2 (9.09) | 8 (36.36) |
| Technicians and associate professionals | 162 | 131 (80.86) | 16 (9.88) | 115 (70.99) |
| Service and sales workers | 97 | 60 (61.86) | 11 (11.34) | 49 (50.52) |
| Craft workers and plant operators | 992 | 862 (86.90) | 118 (11.90) | 744 (75.00) |
| Total | 2221 | 1688 (76.00) | 337 (15.17) | $\frac{1351}{(60.83)}$ |

Table: Vertical mismatch and size of firms

| | | Laı | rge firms | | Small firms | | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------|---------------|------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|------------|-------------|
| Occupations | Worke | No (share) of | No (share) | No (share) | Worke | No (share) of | No (share) | No (share) |
| | \mathbf{rs} | workers | of workers | of workers | rs | workers | of workers | of workers |
| | | with vertical | with over- | with under- | | with vertical | with over- | with under- |
| | | mismatch | education | education | | mismatch | education | education |
| Managers | 683 | 447 | 155 | 292 | 265 | 178 | 35 | 143 |
| | | (65.45) | (22.69) | (42.75) | | (67.17) | (13.21) | (53.96) |
| Professionals | 12 | 5 | | 5 | 10 | 5 | 2 | 3 |
| | | (41.67) | | (41.67) | | (50.00) | (20) | (30.00) |
| Technicians | 78 | 58 | 7 | 51 | 84 | 73 | 9 | 64 |
| and associate professionals | | (74.36) | (8.97) | (65.38) | | (86.90) | (10.71) | (76.19) |
| Service and | 43 | 14 | 6 | 8 | 54 | 46 | 5 | 41 |
| sales workers | | (32.56) | (13.95) | (18.60) | | (85.19) | (9.26) | (75.93) |
| Craft workers | 295 | 244 | 36 | 208 | 697 | 618 | 82 | 536 |
| and plant | | (82.71) | (12.20) | (70.51) | | (88.67) | (11.76) | (76.90) |
| operators | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 1111 | 768 | 204 | 564 | 1110 | 920 | 133 | 787 |
| | | (69.13) | (18.36) | (50.77) | | (82.88) | (11.98) | (70.90) |

Horizontal mismatch

Table: Desired education background of workers by firms

| Occupations | Workers | Share of workers for which firms desired science background | Share of workers for which firms desired humanities background | Share of workers for which firms desired commerce background | Share of workers for which firms desired no specific background |
|-------------------|---------|---|---|---|--|
| Managers | 948 | 231 (24.37) | 15 (1.58) | 92 (9.70) | 610 (64.35) |
| Professionals | 22 | 4 (18.18) | 0 (0) | 17 (77.27) | 1 (4.55) |
| Technicians and | 162 | | | , , , | |
| associate | | 64 | 1 | 4 | 93 |
| professionals | | (39.51) | (0.62) | (2.47) | (57.41) |
| Service and sales | 97 | 6 | 2 | 8 | 81 |
| workers | | (6.19) | (2.06) | (8.25) | (83.51) |
| Craft workers and | 992 | 138 | 4 | 6 | 844 |
| plant operators | | (13.91) | (0.40) | (0.60) | (85.08) |
| Total | 2221 | 443 (19.95) | $\begin{array}{c} 22\\ (0.99) \end{array}$ | $ \begin{array}{r} 127\\ (5.72) \end{array} $ | 1629 (73.35) |

Table: Actual education background of the workers

| Occupations | Workers | Share of workers with science background | Share of workers with humanities background | Share of workers with commerce background | Share of workers with no specific background |
|-------------------|---------|---|---|---|--|
| Managers | 948 | 208 | 156 | 42 | 542 |
| | | (21.94) | (16.46) | (4.43) | (54.17) |
| Professionals | 22 | 4 | 2 | 10 | 6 |
| | | (18.18) | (9.09) | (45.45) | (27.27) |
| Technicians and | 162 | 15 | 28 | 2 | 117 |
| associate | | (9.26) | (17.28) | (1.23) | (72.22) |
| professionals | | | | | |
| Service and sales | 97 | 6 | 24 | 3 | 64 |
| workers | | (6.19) | (24.74) | (3.09) | (65.98) |
| Craft workers and | 992 | 21 | 35 | 6 | 930 |
| plant operators | | (2.12) | (3.53) | (0.60) | (93.75) |
| Total | 2221 | $\begin{array}{c} 254 \\ (11.44) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{c} 245 \\ (11.03) \end{array}$ | 63 (2.84) | $\frac{1659}{(74.70)}$ |

Table: Incidence of horizontal mismatch

| Occupations | Workers | Share of workers with horizontal mismatch | Share of workers with horizontal mismatch (large) | Share of workers with horizontal mismatch (small) |
|---|---------|--|---|---|
| Managers | 948 | 303 (31.96) | 216 (22.78) | 87 (9.18) |
| Professionals | 22 | (36.36) | (18.18) | (18.18) |
| Technicians and associate professionals | 162 | 72 (44.44) | 37 (22.84) | 35 (21.60) |
| Service and sales workers | 97 | 29 (29.90) | 17 (17.53) | 12 (12.37) |
| Craft workers and plant operators | 992 | 178 (17.94) | 66 (6.65) | 112 (11.29) |
| Total | 2221 | 590 (26.56) | 340 (15.31) | 250 (11.26) |

Summary of the incidence of educational mismatch

- There is about 2 years gap between desired level of education and actual level of education
- There is an acute shortage of educated plant workers
- About three-fourth of the workers are subject to vertical mismatch. Under-education is more severe (60%).
- Incidence of under-education is the highest among the floor workers.
- Vertical mismatch is higher for the smaller firms (83% vs. 70%)
- Incidence of horizontal mismatch is low compared to vertical mismatch. It is about 27%.
- These low-tech firms do not have preferences over subject (76%)
- Incidence of horizontal mismatch is the highest for the technicians and associate professionals (44%).

Productivity and educational mismatch

- At two levels:
- Firm level (output per worker)

 $\log\left(\frac{Y}{L}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Vertical\ mismatch + \beta_2 Occupation\ categories + \beta_3\ size\ of\ firm + \beta_4 \log\left(\frac{K}{L}\right) + u \\ \log\left(\frac{Y}{L}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1\ Horizontal\ mismatch + \beta_2 Occupation\ categories + \beta_3\ size\ of\ firm + \beta_4 \log\left(\frac{K}{L}\right) + u$

• Firm-occupation level (monthly salary per occupation)

log(*wages*)

 $= \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 Vertical \ mismatch + \gamma_2 Occupation \ categories + \gamma_3 \ Years \ of \ schooling + \gamma_4 size \ of \ firm + \gamma_5 \log\left(\frac{K}{L}\right) + u \log(wages)$

 $= \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 Horizontal \ mismatch + \gamma_2 Occupation \ categories + \gamma_3 \ Years \ of \ schooling + \gamma_4 size \ of \ firm + \gamma_5 \log\left(\frac{\kappa}{L}\right) + u$

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| VARIABLES | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
| | | | |
| Vertical mismatch | -0.411*** | -0.189* | -0.104 |
| | (0.107) | (0.103) | (0.097) |
| Professionals | | -0.679** | -0.664*** |
| | | (0.308) | (0.250) |
| Technicians | | -0.589*** | -0.353** |
| | | (0.180) | (0.159) |
| Service/sales | | -0.494** | -0.267 |
| workers | | | |
| | | (0.208) | (0.182) |
| Plant workers | | -0.929*** | -0.629*** |
| | | (0.125) | (0.111) |
| Total workers | | | 0.003*** |
| | | | (0.001) |
| Log (K/L) | | | 0.141*** |
| | | | (0.047) |
| Constant | 14.507*** | 14.823*** | 12.608*** |
| | (0.124) | (0.137) | (0.595) |
| | | | |
| Observations | 2,221 | 2,221 | 2,221 |
| R-squared | 0.021 | 0.148 | 0.278 |
| | | | |

Table: Vertical mismatch and output per worker

Dependent variable: Log(Y/L)

Vertical mismatch: dummy variable, assumes 1 if actual level of education does not match desired level, 0 otherwise

Mismatch of education level does not seem to be associated with lower output per worker in a significant way!

| | | | T T |
|--|------------------|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| VARIABLES | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
| | | | |
| Over-education | 0.532^{***} | 0.393*** | 0.144 |
| | (0.164) | (0.144) | (0.117) |
| Professionals | | -0.592* | -0.625** |
| | | (0.322) | (0.253) |
| Technicians | | -0.572*** | -0.355** |
| | | (0.175) | (0.157) |
| Service/sales workers | | -0.447** | -0.251 |
| | | (0.212) | (0.188) |
| Plant workers | | -0.932*** | -0.644*** |
| | | (0.122) | (0.109) |
| Total workers | | | 0.003*** |
| | | | (0.001) |
| Log (K/L) | | | 0.136*** |
| | | | (0.047) |
| Constant | 14.109*** | 14.614*** | 12.582*** |
| | (0.081) | (0.111) | (0.584) |
| | | | |
| Observations | 2,221 | 2,221 | 2,221 |
| R-squared | 0.026 | 0.158 | 0.279 |
| Total workers Log (K/L) Constant Observations | (0.081) 2,221 | -0.932*** (0.122) 14.614*** (0.111) 2,221 | $\begin{array}{c} -0.644^{**} \\ (0.109) \\ 0.003^{**} \\ (0.001) \\ 0.136^{**} \\ (0.047) \\ 12.582^{**} \\ (0.584) \\ \\ 2,221 \end{array}$ |

Table: Over-education and output per worker

Dependent variable: Log(Y/L)

Over-education: dummy variable, assumes 1 if actual level of education is above the desired level, 0 otherwise

Over-education is not also sig. associated with lower output per worker when controlled for size of firms and technology (K/L).

Table: Under-education and output per worker

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|-----------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| VARIABLES | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
| | | | |
| Under-education | -0.604*** | -0.379*** | -0.170* |
| | (0.119) | (0.109) | (0.098) |
| Professionals | | -0.676** | -0.659** |
| | | (0.319) | (0.256) |
| Technicians | | -0.521*** | -0.334** |
| | | (0.173) | (0.158) |
| Service/sales workers | | -0.468** | -0.262 |
| | | (0.196) | (0.179) |
| Plant workers | | -0.858*** | -0.614*** |
| | | (0.121) | (0.110) |
| Total workers | | | 0.003*** |
| | | | (0.001) |
| Log (K/L) | | | 0.134*** |
| | | | (0.047) |
| Constant | 14.561*** | 14.872*** | 12.731*** |
| | (0.123) | (0.134) | (0.605) |
| Observations | 2,221 | 2,221 | 2,221 |
| R-squared | 0.061 | 0.166 | 0.281 |

Dependent variable: Log(Y/L)

Under-education: dummy variable, assumes 1 if actual level of education is below the desired level, 0 otherwise

However, under education is associated with lower output per worker significantly even controlling after size and technology!

| VARIABLES | Blue | White | Lango | Small |
|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| VARIABLES | Diue | white | Large | Sman |
| I ladon oducation | 0.941* | 0.020 | 0.204** | 0.110 |
| Under-education | -0.241* | -0.039 | -0.304** | 0.110 |
| | (0.131) | (0.116) | (0.128) | (0.076) |
| Professionals | -0.664** | | -0.258 | -0.409** |
| | (0.261) | | (0.294) | (0.191) |
| Technicians | -0.325** | | 0.038 | -0.321** |
| | (0.158) | | (0.177) | (0.128) |
| Service/sales | -0.272 | | 0.051 | -0.159 |
| workers | | | | |
| | (0.172) | | (0.168) | (0.170) |
| Plant workers | | | -0.057 | -0.345*** |
| | | | (0.126) | (0.087) |
| Total workers | 0.002*** | 0.007*** | 0.001*** | -0.017*** |
| | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.004) |
| Log (K/L) | 0.170*** | 0.062 | 0.090 | 0.013 |
| | (0.060) | (0.049) | (0.071) | (0.035) |
| Constant | 12.317*** | 12.725*** | 13.864*** | 13.756*** |
| | (0.776) | (0.596) | (0.930) | (0.464) |
| Observations | 1,229 | 992 | 1,104 | 1,110 |
| R-squared | 0.238 | 0.146 | 0.163 | 0.125 |

Table: Under-education and output per worker (heterogeneity)

Dependent variable: Log(Y/L)

The negative association between under-education and lower output per worker is driven by larger firms and for blue collar jobs.

Blue collar jobs: Technicians, plant workers

| | | | | | | - | - |
|--------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------------|---------------|-----------|-----------|
| VARIABLES | Overall | Overall 1 | Overall 2 | Blue | White | Large | Small |
| | | | | | | | |
| Horizontal mismatch | 0.358*** | 0.223** | 0.178** | 0.162* | 0.163 | 0.197* | 0.034 |
| | (0.108) | (0.102) | (0.082) | (0.097) | (0.107) | (0.101) | (0.062) |
| Professionals | | -0.648** | -0.650*** | -0.647** | | -0.260 | -0.437** |
| | | (0.318) | (0.249) | (0.251) | | (0.283) | (0.204) |
| Technicians | | -0.642*** | -0.389** | -0.390** | | -0.045 | -0.300** |
| | | (0.177) | (0.155) | (0.151) | | (0.178) | (0.127) |
| Service/sales workers | | -0.479** | -0.258 | -0.266 | | 0.124 | -0.130 |
| | | (0.209) | (0.181) | (0.179) | | (0.168) | (0.169) |
| Plant workers | | -0.935*** | -0.625*** | | | -0.101 | -0.316*** |
| | | (0.125) | (0.111) | | | (0.130) | (0.088) |
| Total workers | | | 0.003*** | 0.002*** | 0.007*** | 0.002*** | -0.017*** |
| | | | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.004) |
| Log (K/L) | | | 0.141*** | 0.184*** | 0.062 | 0.103 | 0.008 |
| | | | (0.046) | (0.058) | (0.049) | (0.068) | (0.035) |
| Constant | 14.097*** | 14.625*** | 12.486*** | 11.956** * | 12.676** * | 13.478*** | 13.862*** |
| | (0.085) | (0.119) | (0.577) | (0.723) | (0.582) | (0.870) | (0.454) |
| Observations | 2,221 | 2,221 | 2,221 | 1,229 | 992 | 1,104 | 1,110 |
| R-squared | 0.018 | 0.151 | 0.281 | 0.233 | 0.149 | 0.151 | 0.121 |
| | | | | | | | |

Table: Horizontal mismatch and output per worker

Dependent variable: Log(Y/L)

Horizontal mismatch: dummy, assumes 1 if actual field of study does not match with the desired one, 0 otherwise

Horizontal mismatch is associated with higher output per worker!

Table: Vertical mismatch and wages [dep. variable: log(wages)]

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | White | Blue | Large | Small |
|------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Vertical | -0.028 | | | | | | |
| mismatch | | | | | | | |
| | (0.020) | | | | | | |
| Over- | | 0.091*** | | | | | |
| education | | | | | | | |
| | | (0.020) | | | | | |
| Under- | | | -0.081*** | 0.006** | -0.163*** | -0.100*** | -0.063** |
| education | | | (0,005) | (0,009) | (0,09 5) | (0,000) | (0.091) |
| • | | | (0.025) | (0.003) | (0.035) | (0.029) | (0.031) |
| Average | -0.024*** | -0.026*** | -0.030*** | 0.003*** | -0.044*** | -0.023*** | -0.031*** |
| education | | | | | | | |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.003) |
| Total workers | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | -0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.001 |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) |
| Log(K/L) | 0.028*** | 0.025*** | 0.025*** | 0.000 | 0.040*** | 0.024*** | 0.006 |
| | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.006) | (0.001) | (0.010) | (0.007) | (0.010) |
| Constant | 11.521*** | 11.546*** | 11.642*** | 10.527*** | 11.610*** | 11.700*** | 11.647*** |
| | (0.091) | (0.089) | (0.091) | (0.019) | (0.146) | (0.106) | (0.148) |
| Observations | 2,221 | 2,221 | 2,221 | 992 | 1,229 | 1,104 | 1,110 |
| R-squared | 0.833 | 0.835 | 0.836 | 0.128 | 0.734 | 0.894 | 0.690 |

Table: Horizontal mismatch and wages

[dep. variable: log(wages)]

| | | White | Blue | Large | Small |
|---------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------------|
| Horizontal mismatch | -0.052*** | 0.004 | -0.086*** | -0.028 | -0.084*** |
| | (0.019) | (0.002) | (0.029) | (0.020) | (0.027) |
| Average education | -0.022*** | 0.002*** | -0.031*** | -0.015*** | -0.025*** |
| | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.004) |
| Total workers | 0.000*** | -0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.000*** | 0.001 |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) |
| Log(K/L) | 0.028*** | -0.000 | 0.047*** | 0.027*** | 0.008 |
| | (0.007) | (0.001) | (0.011) | (0.007) | (0.010) |
| Constant | 11.492*** | 10.537*** | 11.339*** | 11.538*** | 11.562^{***} |
| | (0.089) | (0.019) | (0.142) | (0.101) | (0.149) |
| | | | | | |
| Observations | 2,221 | 992 | 1,229 | 1,104 | 1,110 |
| R-squared | 0.834 | 0.124 | 0.727 | 0.891 | 0.692 |

Summary of regression results

- If the workers' level of education is below the desired level by the employers (i.e. under-education), it is negatively associated with the output per worker of the firms.
- Under-education affects output per worker more severely in larger firms.
- Mismatch in field of education has been found to be positively associated with output per worker! [puzzling]
- Employers reward over-educated workers with higher wages and punish under-educated workers with lower wages.
- The punishment for under-education is greater for larger firms and blue collar jobs.
- Employers also punish workers with horizontal mismatch with lower wages.
- This punishment is more severe for smaller firms and blue collar jobs.

Conclusion and policy implications

- First study on the impact of educational mismatch on labor productivity and wages in developing country context.
- Under-education is more severe than over-education, unlike developed countries.
- Even in low tech setting, level of education of the workers below the desired level can lower output per worker.
- Why firms are hiring under-educated workers? Why market is not correcting this problem?
- What role government can play?
- Can training be a substitute for formal education?
- Another BIDS study shows that it can to some extent!
- Skill development programs should not be implemented in isolation → should be a part of overall human capital development strategy.

Thank You